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CONNECTING REGULATIONS AND
COMPETITION LAW: A SWISS
PERSPECTIVE ON LIBERALIZATION
CHRISTIAN BOVET* AND PHILIPPE GUGLER**
I
INTRODUCTION
It is debated whether it is possible to liberalize markets successfully by
means of introducing unrestrained competition only, or whether it is necessary
to have regulators to supervise the opening of markets in adversarial adminis-
trative proceedings.  Presenting these as the only options, however, oversimpli-
fies the issues involved.  That simple opposition suggests that sectoral authori-
ties—which are federal regulatory agencies having jurisdiction over a particular
industry—and competition authorities—which are federal agencies with broad
jurisdiction over all industries limited to the issue of fostering competition—are
antagonistic and that an unrestrained market might, on its own, resolve the
problems of liberalization.  This view, however, ignores the fact that competi-
tion authorities can and do intervene in the market to prevent anti-competitive
behaviors such as unlawful agreements and abuse of a dominant market posi-
tion.  Although it is true that regulators often must consider issues related to
competition, it is also important to have persons with specialized knowledge of
the regulated industries working for these authorities, as well as people quali-
fied for activities specific to the regulator’s job, such as the granting of licenses.
When liberalizing its telecommunications industry—the only former public
sector industry that is fully liberalized—Switzerland created a special adminis-
trative commission to oversee competition and introduced market regulations
designed to protect effective competition.  A modus vivendi has been estab-
lished between the regulative and competitive authorities, with close coopera-
tion on certain issues required by law.  Measures aimed at liberalizing the elec-
tricity sector are also under way.  This article is a description of the problems
and solutions found in Switzerland.  Part II begins with a description of the fac-
tual background.  Part III discusses present or proposed regulations for the
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telecommunications and electricity industries.  Part IV concludes with a discus-
sion of national competition law.
II
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Terminology
In recent years, the privatization phenomenon has expanded in industrial-
ized countries.  In the process, the term “privatization” has taken on several
meanings.1  In everyday use, privatization often is simply equated with market
liberalization.  However, the terms are not synonymous.  “Privatization” in its
narrowest sense refers to the opening of the capital of a state-owned industry to
private investors.2  France and England have seen several waves of this sort of
privatization as control of their governments has swung from the right to the
left and back again.  Typically, right-leaning governments move to privatize in-
dustrial companies involved in energy production, banks, insurance companies,
and national railways.  Market liberalization, on the other hand, refers to end-
ing a state monopoly in an economic sector while usually maintaining govern-
ment regulation of the industry.  Once liberalization is realized, consumers have
a choice among several operators.
Strictly speaking, then, privatization is distinct from market liberalization.
However, privatization of some portion of an industry previously under the
complete control of the state often entails market liberalization, as demon-
strated by the recent liberalization of the telecommunications market in Swit-
zerland, which is discussed below.3  There has not yet been any real, stricto
sensu, privatization in Switzerland; the Swiss Confederation still controls the
majority of the share capital of the Swiss Telecommunications Company
(“Swisscom”), which was “privatized” in 1998.4  If this article dealt with privati-
zation in the narrower sense, it would conclude right here.
In addition to market liberalization, a third form of privatization, in the
broad sense, consists of changing the structure of public services.  In this sort of
privatization, no true liberalization takes place.  Instead, the state retains own-
ership of the public service, but the government modifies its organization and
1. See Tobias Jaag, Dezentralisierung und Privatisierung öffentlicher Aufgaben: Formen, Voraus-
setzungen und Rahmenbedingungen, in DEZENTRALISIERUNG UND PRIVATISIERUNG ÖFFENTLICHER
AUFGABEN 23 (Tobias Jaag ed., 2000); Blaise Knapp, Quelles limites constitutionnelles aux privatisa-
tions?, REVUE SUISSE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES 1 (Special issue 1999).
2. One of the first significant publications on the subject is RECHTLICHE PROBLEME DER
PRIVATISIERUNG, BERNER TAGE FUR DIE JURISTISCHE PRAXIS—BTJP 1997 (Wolfgang Wiegand ed.,
1998).  See also the detailed bibliography in Jaag, supra note 1.  For a recent and complete presentation
of aspects pertaining to the status of civil servants, see FONCTION PUBLIQUE: VERS UNE
PRIVATISATION? (Gabriel Aubert et al. eds., 2000).
3. See Federal Law on Telecommunications of April 30, 1997, Recueil systématique du droit
fédéral [RS] 784.10 (Switz.) and related regulations, RS 784.101-784.491.
4. See Decree of Oct. 6, 1997, Recueil officiel des lois et ordonnances de la Confédération suisse
[RO] 1997 2206 (Switz.).
BOVET_FMT.DOC 01/17/01  2:40 PM
Page 133: Autumn 2000]  SWISS PERSPECTIVE ON LIBERALIZATION 135
management.  Typically, the legislature will pass a special law granting inde-
pendence to the persons and assets generating the activity in question, which
becomes part of a separate body with its own capital.  The new entity takes the
form of a private law company, or a so-called “public establishment.”  All rights
and obligations relating to the activity are transferred to the new entity.  The
most significant example of this type of privatization in Switzerland is the re-
structuring of the Swiss Railways.5  Less far-reaching, perhaps, but equally in-
teresting, is the privatization of the Swiss Federal Institute for Intellectual
Property, which transferred all activities of the federal office managing patents,
trademarks, and copyrights to a new independent entity.6  Such reorganizations
are known in Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe as the “new public man-
agement.”7
B. General Economic Background
State monopolies generally involve public services and the use of public
property (domaine public).  The three main privatization projects in Switzer-
land—telecommunications, electricity, and railways—all involve these public
features.  Before the process of privatization began, all were natural monopo-
lies.  They were also legal monopolies because they were institutionalized by
law and, in some cases, by the federal constitution.8
Liberalization is most mature in the telecommunications industry.  Some
telecommunications resources, such as radio frequencies and satellite orbits, are
scarce because it is not feasible for all service providers to have parallel or si-
multaneous use of them.  Telephone numbers and internet domain names are
also scarce because they are determined by a finite number of characters, fur-
ther constrained by our limited ability to memorize the characters.
Other telecommunication resources are unlimited in theory, but for techni-
cal or economic reasons, several market participants need access to them.  The
usual network of copper or optic fiber cables serving ordinary communications
could be duplicated by each market participant.  Each operator could install its
own parallel cable network on the same property.  It would not be economically
feasible to do so, however, because there are 300 such operators in Switzerland
today, after only two and a half years of liberalization.9  It is more economical
for these operators to use the existing network of the former monopolist.  Be-
yond the laying of cable, new operators would also have to undertake the cost
5. See Federal Law on Federal Railways of March 20, 1998, RS 742.31 (Switz.).
6. See Federal Law on the Status and Tasks of the Federal Institute for Intellectual Property of
March 24, 1995, RS 172.010.31 (Switz.).
7. This is a multiform concept.  See PHILIPPE MASTRONARDI & KUNO SCHEDLER, NEW PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT IN STAAT UND RECHT, EIN DISKURS (1998).
8. See CONSTITUTION FÉDÉRALE [CST.] arts. 24-bis, 36 (1874) (Switz.).  These monopolies are no
longer institutionalized in the Swiss Federal Constitution.  See CST. arts. 91, 92 (1999) (effective Jan. 1,
2000), RS 101.
9. See list of service providers  (visited Nov. 29, 2000) <http://www.bakom.ch/Service_Provider_
Liste/welcome_f.html>.
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of acquiring a web of real estate rights parallel to the one acquired over the
years by the former monopolist.
Liberalization in the telecommunications industry has resulted in the crea-
tion of two main markets, one in network access (interconnection), and another
in all other telecommunications services.10  Operators will have to share some of
their telecommunications installations (collocation) and, in some situations, co-
ordinate the use of public property.  These situations arise not only when it
comes to scarce resources, but also for other resources.11  The principles devel-
oped in liberalizing the telecommunications industry inspired lawmakers who
subsequently turned to liberalize the electricity industry.12
III
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. Telecommunications
This section introduces the general regulatory framework for the liberaliza-
tion of the telecommunications market established by the World Trade Organi-
zation (“WTO”)13 and Switzerland’s full implementation of the WTO rules in its
own national regulations.14
The WTO is the successor of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
of 1947 (“GATT 47”)15 and is now the main international body regulating the
public law aspects of international trade.  The WTO superseded the position of
its predecessor by acquiring legal status as an international organization and by
increasing the number and representation of member states.  In addition, its
regulations are far more specific and precise, making them easier to comply
with and to enforce.
Four main agreements complete the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization signed at Marrakech, Morocco, in December 1994: (1)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 199416 (“GATT 94”); (2) General
Agreement on Trade in Services17 (“GATS”); (3) Agreement on Trade-Related
10. See Commission Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in
the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. (C 265) 2.
11. See discussion infra Section III.A.
12. See discussion infra Section III.B.
13. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Dec. 15, 1993, 33
I.L.M. 1 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
14. See Federal Law on Telecommunications of April 30, 1997, RS 784 (Switz.).
15. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 47].
16. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra
note 13, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND [hereinafter LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS] vol. 21; 33 I.L.M 28 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 94].
17. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 13,
Annex 1B, art. XV, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 16, vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 51 (1994) [hereinafter
GATS].
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Aspects of Intellectual Property Protection18 (“TRIPS”); and (4) Understanding
on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes19 (“DSU”).
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which plays a very significant
role in the opening of markets, is also relevant to the telecommunications indus-
try.20  Its provisions aim at ensuring that technical regulations (1) treat like
products the same whether they are of domestic origin or are imported from
any country that is a party to the agreement and (2) are not written, adopted, or
applied with the intention or effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to interna-
tional trade.21  The principles embodied in these provisions are implemented in
national and multinational regulations governing telecommunications equip-
ment and installations.22  Because the parties could not reach a full agreement
on access to the telecommunications market in 1994, they decided to begin by
defining the basis for negotiations in an Annex to GATS.23  These discussions
resulted in the Fourth Protocol to the GATS of April 1997.24
To understand that document, it is necessary first to understand the main
provisions of GATS.  The provisions of both the WTO agreements and their
predecessor, GATT, recognize two categories of commitments: (1) the general
commitment that may not be undermined or modified by the parties to recogni-
tion of most-favored nation status (“MFN status”);25 and (2) the specific com-
mitments of the nations that are parties to the agreement.  General commit-
ments apply horizontally to all sectors and to all members, whereas specific
commitments apply only to specific sectors in specific member nations.  These
latter commitments vary from country to country.  The terms, limitations, and
conditions to which each nation agreed are presented in individual schedules of
commitments.26  The extent of a member state’s obligations and the treatment of
foreign service suppliers may be determined by referring to these documents.
18. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Protection, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, supra note 13, Annex VII, art. 65.2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 16, vol. 31; 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
19. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 13, Annex II, art. 4, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 16, vol. 31;
33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
20. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 13,
Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 16, vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TBT
Agreement].
21. See id. art. 2.
22. See, e.g., Federal Law on the Elimination of Technical Obstacles to Trade of Oct. 6, 1995, RS
946.51 (Switz.).
23. See GATS, supra note 17, Annex on Telecommunications, LEGAL TEXTS—RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS [hereinafter LEGAL TEXTS] 359, ¶
3(b)-(c) (GATT Secretariat 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1192 (1994) [hereinafter GATS, Annex on Telecommuni-
cations].
24. See different nations’ schedules of specific commitments (visited Nov. 30, 2000) <http://www.
wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.html> [hereinafter Schedules of Commitments].
25. See GATS, supra note 17, art. II(1) (“With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement,
each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any
other Member treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of
any other country.”).
26. See Schedules of Commitments, supra note 24.
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Several GATS provisions aim at opening markets, by measures such as (1)
setting reasonable standards regarding domestic regulations;27 (2) requiring rec-
ognition of foreign authorizations, licenses, or other certifications of service
suppliers;28 (3) ensuring market access;29 and (4) specifying national treatment.30
Additionally, GATS contains two provisions applying to the specific commit-
ments that seek to protect competition.  Article VIII of GATS is drafted in
rather strong terms to curtail abuses of monopolies and to prevent exclusive
service suppliers.31  On the other hand, Article IX simply provides that
“[m]embers recognize that certain business practices of service suppliers, other
than those falling under Article VIII, may restrain competition and thereby re-
strict trade in services.”32  Obviously, this provision leaves a great deal of discre-
tion to the member nations as to the definition of these restraints on competi-
tion, the regimes applying to them, and the measures available to a nation’s
authorities to oppose them.33  Article IX of GATS states the principle of posi-
tive comity.34
The results of the WTO negotiations on basic telecommunications are con-
tained in the Fourth Protocol, which includes the commitments of sixty-nine
governments as specified in fifty-five schedules.35  All industrialized countries
participated in the deal, and more than forty developing countries also took
part.36  The markets of the participants accounted for eighty-two per cent of
global telecommunication revenues.37  The participants in the negotiations suc-
ceeded in elaborating a set of principles covering matters such as competition
safeguards, interconnection guarantees, transparency in licensing processes, and
27. See GATS, supra note 17, art. VI.
28. See id. art. VII.
29. See id. art. XVI.
30. See id. art. XVII.
31. See id. art. VIII (providing that “each Member shall ensure that any monopoly supplier of a
service in its territory does not, in the supply of the monopoly service in the relevant market, act in a
manner inconsistent with that Member’s obligations under Article II and specific commitments”) (em-
phasis added).
32. Id. art. IX (emphasis added).
33. For a discussion of the efforts to set up an international antitrust code within the framework of
the WTO, see TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES: KEY ISSUES AND COMMENTS ON THE WTO
REPORT (1998) ON TRADE AND COMPETITION (Roger Zäch ed., 1999).
34. It provides that:
Each Member shall, at the request of any other Member, enter into consultations with a view
to eliminating practices referred to in paragraph 1.  The Member addressed shall accord full
and sympathetic consideration to such a request and shall cooperate through the supply of
publicly available non-confidential information of relevance to the matter in question.  The
Member addressed shall also provide other information available to the requesting Member,
subject to its domestic law and to the conclusion of satisfactory agreement concerning the
safeguarding of its confidentiality by the requesting Member.
GATS, supra note 17, art. IX.
35. See Fourth Protocol to GATS, supra note 17, 36 I.L.M. 354 (1997) [hereinafter Fourth Proto-
col].
36. See id.
37. See Council for Trade in Services, Telecommunication Services: Background Note by the Secre-
tariat, Dec. 8, 1998, at 2 (visited Nov. 29, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/wto/english/tratop_e/serv_e/
w74.doc>.
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the independence of regulators.38  In substance, the Fourth Protocol aims at
making domestic telecommunication regulations market-oriented and curtailing
the discretion of regulatory agencies.39  Indeed, if discretionary public interest
regulations were to discriminate against foreign suppliers, these regulations
would violate the WTO agreements.40
The contents of the Fourth Protocol were previously described in a negoti-
ated text called the “Reference Paper.”41  The signatories of the Fourth Protocol
also agreed to use this document as a tool to decide which regulatory disciplines
to undertake as additional commitments, as is evident from a comparison of the
Reference Paper with the various schedules of specific commitments.42
Each nation’s schedule of commitments contains a commitment to maintain
specific measures to prevent suppliers from unilaterally or collectively engaging
in anti-competitive practices.43  Such anti-competitive practices include engaging
in cross-subsidization, using information obtained from competitors for anti-
competitive results, and failing to make technical information about essential
facilities and commercially relevant information needed for the provision of
services available to other service suppliers on a timely basis.44  The Fourth Pro-
tocol defines a “major supplier” as one with the power “materially [to] affect
the terms of participation,” either due to its control over essential facilities or its
market position.45  This definition is important to all nations applying intercon-
nection, because it guarantees that they must provide interconnection under the
following conditions:
[1] under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including technical standards and
specifications) and rates and of a quality no less favourable than that provided for its
own like services or for like services of non-affiliated service suppliers of for its sub-
sidiaries of other affiliates;
[2] in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including technical standards and specifi-
cations) and cost-oriented rates that are transparent, reasonable, having regard to
economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the supplier need not pay for
network components of facilities that it does not require for the service to be pro-
vided; and
38. See General Obligations and Disciplines, GATS, supra note 17 (visited Nov. 29, 2000)
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/2-obdis.htm>.
39. See id.
40. See Toshiaki Takigawa, The Impact of the WTO Telecommunications Agreement on U.S. and
Japanese Telecommunications Regulations, 32(6) J. WORLD TRADE 33 (1998).
41. See Negotiating Group on Telecommunications, Reference Paper (Apr. 24, 1996) (visited Nov.
29, 2000) <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/servte_e/tel23_e.htm> [hereinafter Reference Paper].
42. Compare Reference Paper, supra note 41, with Schedules of Commitments, supra note 24.
43. See Schedules of Commitments, supra note 24.
44. See id.
45. GATS, supra note 17, pts. IV, VI; see also ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV.,
IMPLICATION OF THE WTO AGREEMENT ON BASIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS, JOINT GROUP ON
TRADE AND COMPETITION (1999).
BOVET_FMT.DOC 01/17/01  2:40 PM
140 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 4
[3] upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered to
the majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost of construction of neces-
sary additional facilities.46
All WTO member nations are bound by and benefit from these negotiated
terms because of their MFN status.  It was possible, however, for the partici-
pants to file an MFN exemption on measures affecting trade in basic telecom-
munications services.  Nine governments submitted exemption lists to be an-
nexed to the Fourth Protocol.47  For example, the exemption filed by the United
States relates to one-way satellite transmissions to direct home broadcasting
and direct broadcasting by satellite television services and digital audio serv-
ices.48
The Swiss schedule of specific commitments covers telephone, packet-
switched data transmission, circuit-switched data transmission, and telex, tele-
graph, facsimile, and private leased circuit services.49  Switzerland committed to
maintaining no limitation on market access and to national treatment of cross-
border trade, consumption abroad, and commercial presence.50  The United
States submitted commitments related mainly to the same services,51 though it
also listed some limitations on market access.52  For instance, the United States
reserved Comsat’s exclusive rights to links with Intelsat and Inmarsat.53
India, also a potentially significant telecommunications market, submitted a
rather limited schedule of commitments.54  It made no commitment for cross-
border trade or for consumption abroad.55  It also made no commitment on na-
tional treatment and introduced several limitations on market access.56  Finally,
India submitted two MFN exemptions related to international telecommunica-
tions services.57
Although the Fourth Protocol is limited to trade in services, it might have
implications for trade in goods and for more general multilateral rulemaking on
competition.58  Indeed, it is based on the GATS commitments to MFN status
and national treatment linked to schedules of commitments, as well as on spe-
46. Switzerland’s Schedule of Specific Commitments § 2.2, Schedules of Commitments, supra note
24 [hereinafter Switzerland’s Schedule].
47. See Schedules of Commitments, supra note 24 (setting forth schedules of specific commitments
for Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the
United States).
48. See United States’s Schedule of Specific Commitments, Schedules of Commitments, supra note
24 [hereinafter United States’s Schedule].
49. See Switzerland’s Schedule, supra note 46.
50. See id.
51. See id.; United States’s Schedule, supra note 48.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.; India’s Schedule of Specific Commitments, Schedules of Commitments, supra note 24.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., supra note 45.
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cific provisions imposing transparency guarantees and measures against abuses
of dominance by monopoly suppliers.
One of the remaining unresolved questions about GATS and its accessory
agreements is whether they have direct effect in the legal systems of the mem-
ber states.  Can they be invoked as self-applicable sources of law in domestic
courts without having first been incorporated into domestic legal systems?  De-
cisions of the European Community Court of Justice regarding GATT 47 indi-
cate that the answer to this question is no.59  In International Fruit v. Produk-
tschap voor Groenten en Fruit, the court held that these rules had no direct
domestic effect because of their high level of flexibility.60  This position was con-
firmed twenty-two years later in Germany v. Council, where the court stated
that these provisions were not without conditions.61  The court may apply a dif-
ferent analysis under GATT 94 and its related regulations, as evidenced in its
2000 Bureau Européen des Unions des Consommateurs (“BEUC”) decision,
where the European Community Court of First Instance stated:
[I]n [International Fruit], the Court of Justice ruled that the provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [of 1947] had the effect of binding the Community.
The same conclusion must be reached both in the case of GATT 1994 . . . and in the
case of the 1994 Anti-Dumping Code . . . .
Secondly, it is worth emphasising that the third point in the recital in the preamble to
the Basic Regulation states that the latter was adopted “to amend the Community
rules in the light of” the new Agreements concluded at the end of the multilateral
trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), including the Antidumping
Code.  Furthermore, the fifth recital in the preamble to that regulation states that the
Antidumping Code “contains new and detailed rules,” relating in particular to the cal-
culation of dumping, procedures for initiating and pursuing an investigation, including
the establishment and treatment of the facts, the imposition of provisional measures,
the imposition and collection of anti-dumping duties, the duration and review of anti-
dumping measures and the public disclosure of information relating to anti-dumping
investigations, and that “in view of the extent of the changes and to ensure a proper
and transparent application of the new rules, the language of the new agreements
should be brought into Community legislation as far as possible.”
67. It follows that the Commission is right to interpret the Basic Regulation in the
light of the Antidumping Code.62
The European Community Court of Justice took a similar approach in its 1998
Hermès International decision, where it stated:
[S]ince the Community is a party to the TRIPS Agreement and since that agreement
applies to the Community trade mark, the courts referred to in Article 99 of Regula-
tion No 40/94, when called upon to apply national rules with a view to ordering provi-
59. See, e.g., Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Co. v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, 1972
E.C.R. 1219; Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-4973.
60. See International Fruit, 1972 E.C.R.  ¶ 21.
61. See Germany v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-4973 ¶ 9.
62. Case T-256/97 Bureau Européen des Unions des Consommateurs (BEUC) v. Commission of
the European Communities, 2000 E.C.R. ____, (visited Dec. 4, 2000) <http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-
bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&docrequire=alldocs&numaff=t-256%2F97&datefs=&datefe=&
nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=&resmax=100>.
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sional measures for the protection of rights arising under a Community trade mark,
are required to do so, as far as possible . . . .63
1.  National Law in General.  The Swiss telecommunications market was
fully liberalized on January 1, 1998.64  Consumers may now freely choose their
telecommunication services provider or providers.  Market supervision has
been entrusted to the Swiss Federal Communications Commission
(“ComCom”),65 an authority fully independent from the government, which acts
in cooperation with the Federal Communication Office (“OFCOM”).66
The Swiss Federal Law on Telecommunications of April 30, 1997 (“LTC”)
sets the general rules governing the liberalization of the Swiss telecommunica-
tions market.67  The Swiss Federal Council (that is, the national government),
the competent federal department—in this case the Federal Department of En-
vironment, Transport, Energy and Communications (“DETEC”)—ComCom,
and OFCOM adopted several ordinances and regulations implementing the
LTC.68  In addition, the Swiss Parliament passed the Federal Law on the Or-
ganization of the Telecommunication Company of April 30, 1997, which de-
fined the status of the former monopolist after the liberalization.69  The follow-
ing sections focus on the main instruments used in granting and accelerating
market access—the LTC and the Ordinance on Telecommunication Services
(“OTS”).70
2.  Instruments of Liberalization.  Interconnection, which has been the main
instrument of liberalization, is the linking of telecommunication transportation
networks among suppliers that allows the users of one supplier to communicate
with users of another network and to access services provided by another
supplier.71  Regulations impose the duty to participate in interconnection on
major suppliers.  Swiss law designates as major suppliers those operators
63. Case C-53/96, Hermès Int’l v. FHT Marketing Choice BV, 1998 E.C.R. I-3603, ¶ 28.
64. See Decree of Oct. 6, 1997, RO 1997 2206.
65. See ComCom’s website (visited Sept. 10, 2000) <http://www.fedcomcom.ch>.
66. See OFCOM’s website  (visited Sept. 10, 2000) <http://www.bakom.ch/eng/>.
67. See Swiss Federal Law on Telecommunications of April 30, 1997, RS 784.10 [hereinafter LTC].
68. See Swiss Federal Council’s Ordinance on Telecommunication Services of Oct. 6, 1997, RS
784.101  (Switz.) [hereinafter OTS].
69. See RS 784.11.  For a discussion of the transfer of assets beyond privatization, see Rolf H.
Weber, Fragen der Vermogensübertragung bei der Überführung öffentlicher Aufgaben auf verwaltung-
sexterne Rechtsträgerin DEZENTRALISIERUNG UND PRIVATISIERUNG ÖFFENTLICHER AUFGABEN 67
(Tobias Jaag ed., 2000).
70. See OTS, supra note 68.
71. With minor changes, the above definition is based on the essential components of the WTO
definition.  Each multilateral and national regulation contains its own definition of interconnection.
Although the European definition is rather sophisticated, it describes exactly the same concept as Sec-
tion 2 of the GATS Fourth Protocol.  See Fourth Protocol, supra note 35; LTC, supra note 67, art. 3(e);
Commission Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 30, 1997, on
Interconnection in Telecommunications with Regard to Ensuring Universal Service and
Interoperability through Application of the Principles of Open Network Provision (“ONP”), art.
2(1)(a), 1997 O.J. (L 199) 32 [hereinafter Directive 97/33/EC].
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holding a dominant position under competition law.72  The implementation of
these obligations is governed by two principles.  First, major suppliers must
grant other suppliers interconnection under non-discriminatory terms,
conditions, and rates.  The former monopolist cannot treat one supplier better
than any others.  The standards of the interconnection provider applied within
the group will serve as a basis for the assessment of the quality of the
interconnection service.  As a result, service to other suppliers must be
comparable to that provided to the major supplier’s subsidiaries and affiliates.
Interconnection rates imposed upon third parties must not be less favorable
than those applied internally to member entities of the interconnection
provider’s group.73  Information and technical means must be shared under the
same terms and conditions and with the same level of quality.74
Second, a reasonable amount of transparency must be maintained.  Informa-
tion pertaining to interconnection agreements and to costs must remain publicly
available.  The website of OFCOM, for example, explicitly mentions the inter-
connection agreements each provider entered with Swisscom, the former mo-
nopolist.75  Any market participant—or even any web user—can know which
provider is receiving interconnection services.  Anyone who establishes a valid
interest—beyond mere curiosity—is entitled to examine the contracts them-
selves, absent an overriding private or public interest in protecting the informa-
tion.76
To facilitate the opening of the telecommunications market, interconnection
rates must be tied to costs.  Beyond the economic need, this requirement is
based on the policy rationale that, because the former monopolist was able to
build its network partly at the expense of the community, it should redistribute
this competitive advantage to other operators; otherwise, the monopolist will
realize a windfall.  Calculating the costs of interconnection is delicate work,
however, because there are costs directly related to the interconnection of the
network, as well as costs arising from its establishment, maintenance, and re-
newal.77  The law also seeks to impart to the interconnection provider a reason-
able return on its investment.  If the provider cannot determine its costs, the
72. See LTC, supra note 67, art. 11.  This concept is similar to (1) the provisions of Directive
97/33/EC, supra note 71, arts. 4(2)-(3), which use the concept of “significant market power” and (2) the
main hypothesis defined by Directive 97/33/EC, annex II, which refers to operators controlling network
access in one or several network termination points (“NTPs”).  The Swiss and European Union regula-
tions should implement these provisions thanks to the proposed changes relating to the European
regulatory framework.  See Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks and Associ-
ated Facilities, COM(00)384 at 4.
73. See Schedules of Commitments, supra note 24.
74. See id.
75. See Service Providers for Switzerland (visited Dec. 2, 2000) <http://www.bakom.ch/Service_
Provider_Liste/welcome.html>.
76. See LTC, supra note 67, art. 11(5).
77. See Christian Bovet, Réception du droit public économique étranger en Suisse, 3 SOCIÉTÉ
SUISSE DES JURISTES: RAPPORTS ET COMMUNICATIONS 277, 291 (2000) (comparing the regimes ap-
plied in Switzerland and the European Union).
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regulator will likely perform a comparative study.78  These procedures will prove
useful in other portions of the telecommunications industry as well, particularly
in the case of collocation.79  The law states:
The Federal Office [OFCOM] may, for reasons of public interest, in particular due to
technical difficulties, developmental needs or protection of the countryside, the na-
tional heritage, or wildlife, require the holder of a license for telecommunication
services to accord to a third party, in return for appropriate compensation, the right to
make joint use of its installations and transmitters, provided they have sufficient ca-
pacity.  The provisions on interconnection (Art. 11) shall apply mutatis mutandis.80
In substance, the regime for which this rule provides may be presented as
follows:  First, the obligation exclusively targets license holders.  Although
transmitters or other equipment are sometimes installed on public land, the
state is not directly concerned with this regime.  Second, the decision is made by
OFCOM within an ordinary administrative procedure; the interested parties are
heard by the federal authority.  Third, a license holder using the installations of
another must properly indemnify the latter for this collocation.81  Article 28 of
OTS merely states that “total costs” must be shared in adequate proportions
between the suppliers involved in the project.82  Although there is no practice in
this field yet, one could argue that some additional indications may be found in
OTS provisions dealing with interconnection, and that the rather-developed ac-
counting regime applied today in relation to interconnection could also govern
collocation to a broad extent in the future.
In early 2000, the Swiss Federal Council adopted an ordinance on non-
ionizing radiation.83  The aim of the regulation is to protect the environment
and, in particular, human beings, against the possibly negative effects of this
physical phenomenon.  This ordinance might actually clash with the practice of
collocation, which in great part pursues the same objective.  For example, the
Ordinance on Radiation provides that, in order to calculate the relevant rates,
78.  See Directive 97/33/EC, supra note 71, art. 7(2) (putting the burden of proof regarding the es-
tablishment of real costs on the interconnection provider).
79. See Fifth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package,
COM(99)537 final, at annex 3. 25 (visited Nov. 30, 2000) <http://europa.eu.int/comm/information_
society/policy/telecom/5threport/index_en.htm>.
80. LTC, supra note 67, art. 36(2), translated in 1 ANDRÁS A. GUROVITS, ET AL., DAS
SCHWEIZERISCHE TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSRECHT LE DROIT DES TÉLÉCOMMUNICATIONS SUISSE 142
(1998) (emphasis added).  The extent of this reference to interconnection rules is difficult to determine.
For instance, ComCom decides on the interconnection rate, while OFCOM determines the amount of
the indemnification in case of collocation.  Article 11 of LTC defines a three-stage procedure with re-
spect to interconnection: (1) the parties must first try to reach an agreement on the interconnection
rate; (2)  if they fail to do so, then ComCom will make a formal decision on the issue; and (3) this deci-
sion may be submitted in an appeal procedure to the Swiss Federal Tribunal.  See id.  The first two
steps may also occur in a collocation procedure, except that the decision will be taken by OFCOM, not
ComCom.  But appeals against the OFCOM’s decision will have to be filed before the Swiss Federal
Appeal Commission of the Department of Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications, not
the Federal Tribunal.  However, this commission’s decision may be eventually appealed before the lat-
ter court.
81. See LTC, supra note 67, art. 36(2).
82. See OTS, supra note 68, art. 28.
83. See Ordinance on the Protection against Non-Ionizing Radiation, RS 814.710 (visited Nov. 16,
2000) <http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/c814_710.html> [hereinafter Ordinance on Radiation].
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one must take into account all the installations that are on the mast.84  In fact,
this might make it technically difficult to reconcile the objective of Article 36 of
LTC—avoiding a “forest of telecommunication masts”—with the radiation pro-
tection objective proposed by the ordinance.85  In addition, this type of regula-
tion will have essentially a negative impact on the development of the mobile
telecommunication networks of new market entrants, because the former mo-
nopolist will have already built most of its networks.86
The third instrument available to the lawmaker in order to favor the open-
ing of the telecommunication market is the use of land.  Indeed, it can institute
a flexible regime with respect to rights-of-way—as is the case in Switzerland.87
Under Article 35 of LTC:
1  Owners of land in public use (such as roads, footpaths, public squares, waterways,
lakes and river banks) are required to allow license holders for telecommunication
services to use that land to install and operate lines and public call boxes, provided
those installations do not interfere with the public use of the land.
2  License holders for telecommunications services shall show consideration for the
use for which the property in question is put and shall bear the cost of restoring it to
its original state.  They are required to move their lines if the property owner wishes to
use the property for a purpose that is incompatible with their presence.
3  The Federal Council shall regulate the detailed rules for implementation, in par-
ticular the license holder’s duty of co-ordination and the conditions governing the re-
location of lines and public call boxes.
4  The authorization procedure shall be simple and rapid.  No charge other than a
charge to cover costs may be levied for the use of the land, provided that it does not
interfere with its public use.88
These provisions are supplemented by Articles 25-27 of OTS.89  Regarding the
duty of coordination imposed by the LTC on license holders, the ordinance
provides that license holders are not bound to comply with that obligation if it
would prevent the necessary work from being completed within three months of
the day when the authorization was granted.90  In addition, telecommunication
companies are entitled to seek information from other undertakings regarding
future projects that may have an impact on their installations on land in use; the
requested undertakings must reply within a mandatory four-week deadline.91
The four main features of the regime set up by the LTC with respect to
rights-of-way are the following:  First, the rights provided for by Article 35 re-
late exclusively to land in public use.  Excluded from the field of application of
84. See id. annex 1, item 62, ¶ 2.
85. LTC, supra note 67, art. 36.
86. See 1998 COMCOM ANN. REP. 14-15 (visited Nov. 30, 2000) <http://www.fedcomcom.ch
/eng/commission/report.98.pdf>.
87. See Pierre-Yves Gunter, Les infrastructures, in NEUES FERNMELDERECHT, ERSTE
ORIENTIERUNG 51 (Rolf H. Weber ed., 1998).
88. LTC, supra note 67, art. 35.
89. See OTS, supra note 68, arts. 25-27.
90. See id. art. 25(1).
91. See id. art. 25(2).
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this provision are (1) real estate owned by the state but assigned to private use
(so-called “private” or “financial” assets of the state) and (2) real estate owned
by individuals or companies.92  Second, the beneficiaries of these rights are ex-
clusively telecommunication license holders.  Companies registered in another
capacity with OFCOM93 cannot make a request based on Article 35 of LTC.94
Even companies engaged in related fields of activity (such as electricity or water
supply undertakings) do not enjoy this special regime.  Third, license holders
have the right to obtain, and the authorities have the obligation to grant, the
authorization to use streets and roads, for example, for the installation of tele-
communication lines.  This authorization must be granted within the framework
of a simple and rapid procedure.  During the parliamentary debates, there was
even mention of a maximum one-week period between the filing of the request
and the granting of the authorization; such moves sought to accelerate the lib-
eralization of the telecommunication market and the arrival of new providers.
Fourth, the granting of the authorization normally is not subject to any indem-
nification.  The cantons and municipalities can require the payment of only an
administrative fee.  In Geneva, for instance, this fee amounts to 500 Swiss
francs.  The only exception to this rule is the case where the lines permanently
affect the use of the land on which they are installed.
Market access can also be obtained through roaming.  Roaming occurs when
a mobile telecommunication supplier ensures geographical coverage to another
supplier who does not yet have a sufficient network.  The characteristic of this
system is that the services provided by the first supplier are still billed by the
second supplier to its own customers, so that there is no transfer of clients.  The
latter can continue using its mobile phones in the same manner as before, with-
out any significant change in the technical configuration of its outlets.  There is
also an “internal” billing between the two suppliers.  The supplier lacking cov-
erage has an obvious economic and commercial interest in rapidly improving its
geographical coverage, because its provider will endeavor to get as much money
as possible from this situation.  Roaming is not governed by any specific provi-
sion of the LTC or its implementing ordinances.  It is a purely contractual ar-
rangement between telecommunication services suppliers, a very common prac-
tice at the international level.  In fact, it is one of the essential features of
mobile telecommunications.
In Switzerland, a roaming agreement was formed between the former mo-
nopolist Swisscom and a new market entrant, Orange Communications SA.
Another provider complained to ComCom, alleging, among other things, that
this system was hurting effective competition among providers.  The authority
rejected this argument on the basis that the Swiss law had wanted, above all,
competition on services rather than on infrastructure, and that the solution set
up by the parties was, in any event, a temporary one.  In addition, ComCom had
92. See LTC, supra note 67, art. 35.
93. See id. art. 4(2)
94. See id.
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been informed of Orange’s intentions in this respect at the time that it granted
the mobile telecommunication license.95
Yet another important subject in the European telecommunication sector
relates to unbundling, the regulatory obligation of a former monopolist to “pro-
vide physical access for third parties to any technically feasible point of the cop-
per local loop or sub-loop where the new entrant can co-locate and connect its
own network equipment and facilities in order to deliver services to its cus-
tomer, either in the local switch, concentrator or equivalent facility.”96  As is the
case with roaming, there is no explicit legal basis regarding unbundling in Swit-
zerland, which is not a member of the European Union.  Part of the discussion
therefore turns on the question of whether the regulations applying to intercon-
nection at the WTO and national levels constitute a sufficient basis for unbun-
dling.97
B. Electricity
The Swiss market for electricity is currently dominated by several vertically
integrated providers enjoying regional monopolies.  This is reflected in electric-
ity prices for the industry that are significantly higher than the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) average—the second
highest in OECD after Japan—while prices for households are rather modest
but still substantially above the OECD average.98
Strongly encouraged by the establishment, in 1999, of an internal electricity
market in the European Union, and by deregulation measures in some E.U.
member countries beyond what is required by E.U. legislation, the Swiss gov-
ernment started an electricity market reform in the late 1990s.  A draft Federal
Act on the Electricity Market (“Electricity Act”) was presented by the federal
government in June 1999.99  It should be adopted by the Parliament in 2000 and
could enter into force in 2001 if there is no referendum challenge.  According to
this new act, the Swiss electricity market would be compatible with legislation
governing the internal electricity market of the European Union.
The draft Electricity Act provides that the liberalization of the Swiss elec-
tricity market rests on the following main provisions:
(1) Regulated Third Party Access:  Network operators have the duty
to grant access to the grid on a non-discriminatory basis.  The price
95. See Lawful Collaboration By Orange Communications SA with Swisscom within “National
Roaming” Framework, ComCom Press Release of Oct. 8, 1999 (visited Nov. 30, 2000)
<http://www.fedcomcom.ch/eng/press/mitteilung/58.html>.
96. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Unbundled Ac-
cess to the Local Loop, COM(00)761 final, at art. 3(2).
97. See Rolf H. Weber, Entbündelung im Fernmeldemarkt, 4 SIC! 338 (2000).  Technically, this
can also be done through wireless local loop (“WLL”) technology, which uses frequencies to give direct
access to the customers of the provider.  Thus, the monopoly of the holder of the local loop (or “last
mile”) is circumvented.
98. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., OECD ECONOMIC SURVEY 1998-99:
SWITZERLAND 84 (1999).
99. See Feuille fédérale suisse [FF] 1999 7370 (Switz.).
BOVET_FMT.DOC 01/17/01  2:40 PM
148 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: No. 4
must be fixed according to the costs of an efficiently operated net-
work.  Network operators are entrusted with the drafting of a tariff
scheme.  If they do not come to an agreement, or if their agree-
ment does not comply with the principles of cost orientation and
transparency, the government may enact statutory rules for the
pricing.100
(2) Formation of an independent arbitration commission:  This new
body, independent from the government, is responsible for the set-
tlement of disputes concerning the access to the grid.
(3) Formation of a grid company:  This company shall operate the
transmission network (that is, the high-voltage system).  It may not
carry out activities relating to the generation or distribution of
electricity.
(4) Unbundling of accounts:  Integrated electricity companies shall
keep separate accounts for their generation, transmission, and dis-
tribution activities.  This should enable the authority to identify
possible abuses, such as abnormally high tariffs or cross-
subsidization.
The draft Electricity Act predicts the creation of conditions for effective
competition in the electricity market within six years.  However, a more rapid
implementation of the Electricity Act would reduce the price disadvantage that
Swiss industries and households currently bear compared to most neighbor
countries.  In other countries, such as Germany,101 where the electricity market
was fully liberalized in two years,102 some experts are predicting a shortening of
the transition period of full market liberalization to less than six years.103
Liberalization is planned to begin with large power consumers.  Indeed, in
the first three years, only the 110 largest Swiss electricity users—accounting for
twelve percent of total electricity consumption—would be given a choice of
supplier, followed by smaller industrial users, and finally by households.  A
structural change of the sector is expected, as many of the 1200 small electricity
producers will probably have to merge or go out of business, given the impor-
tant potential for realizing economies of scale in the generation and distribution
of electricity.104
Contrary to a previous proposal, the draft Electricity Act no longer calls for
compensation payments to companies that invested in power plants in the past.
100. See Allen Fuchs, Öffnung des Strommarktes—Einige juristische Überlegungen, REVUE SUISSE
DU DROIT DES AFFAIRES 52-67 (Special Issue 1999).
101. See Eurostat, Environment and Energy: Electricity prices for EU industry on 1 January 2000
and Electricity prices for EU households on 1 January 2000: downward trend, No. 5/00 (July 17, 2000);
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Recent Progress
with Building the Internal Electricity Market, COM(00)297 final.
102. The two-year liberalization period resulted in a decrease in electricity prices for the industry by
25% to 35% and for households by 10%.
103. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., OECD ECONOMIC SURVEY 1999-2000:
SWITZERLAND 40 (2000).
104. See id.
BOVET_FMT.DOC 01/17/01  2:40 PM
Page 133: Autumn 2000]  SWISS PERSPECTIVE ON LIBERALIZATION 149
Therefore, the energy producers are lobbying in favor of a new tax on non-
renewable energy sources in order to compensate for the “sunk costs.”  The de-
bate on this issue could delay the reform of the electricity market.  Regardless
of the political discussion and prevailing legal confusion, market forces have al-
ready begun to work.  In the group of large-end consumers, prices have fallen as
much as thirty percent following conclusions of mid- and long-term delivery
contracts between producers and these consumers.105
Given the absence so far of a legal framework accompanying the electricity
market reform, the Competition Commission is playing an important role in the
liberalization process.  Its action is based largely on Article 7 of the Competi-
tion Act, which deals with the abuse of a dominant market position.106  The
Competition Commission opened an investigation in July 1999, when a large
regional electricity supplier was prevented from changing over to a cheaper for-
eign supplier.107  The regional operator, BKW FMB Energy Corporation, which
was simultaneously an electricity provider and network operator, refused to
transmit electricity power produced by any other enterprise throughout its net-
work.108  The metal manufacturer Swissmetal was considering buying electric
power from Laufenburg Energy Corporation through BKW’s network.  As a
consequence of the intervention by the Competition Commission, BKW and
Swissmetal agreed on a long-term contract at more favorable conditions for the
plaintiff.109  Therefore, the Competition Commission closed its investigation
against BKW in February 2000.110  Since then, the Competition Commission has
opened two investigations, as well as a preliminary investigation related to de-
nial of third-party access.111
IV
NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW
The aforementioned developments reveal how competition law can prepare
the path to market liberalization.  The most common and important problem
appearing in newly, or soon to be, liberalized sectors—but also in the phase just
preceding liberalization—is likely the abuse of dominance.  In these sectors, the
traditional monopolist is necessarily dominant and will remain so for many
years.  Furthermore, new competitors often rely on input supplied by the for-
105. See Philippe Gugler, The Role of Swiss Competition Policy in the Liberalisation Processes in
Selected Markets (Jan. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
106. See Federal Act on Cartels and Other Competition Restraints of Oct. 6, 1995, RS 251 (Switz.).
107. See 1 COMMISSION DE LA CONCURRENCE, DROIT ET POLITIQUE DE LA CONCURRENCE 29-36
(2000) (visited Dec. 2, 2000) <http://www.wettbewerbskommission.ch/site/f/dpc/dpc.Par.0004.Pic0.pdf>.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See 2 COMMISSION DE LA CONCURRENCE, DROIT ET POLITIQUE DE LA CONCURRENCE 153-
64 (2000) (visited Dec. 2, 2000) <http://www.wettbewerbskommission.ch/site/f/dpc/dpc.Par.0004.
Pic1.pdf>; ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., OECD ANN. REP. ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1999: SWITZERLAND 3 (1999).
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mer monopolist, such as access to local or universal networks, leading to dis-
putes concerning refusals to deal and discrimination.  Companies with a domi-
nant position in a market risk violating Swiss competition law if they refuse ac-
cess to facilities essential for competition.  Typically, the facility is one that
cannot practically or reasonably be duplicated, and access by the firm’s com-
petitors is feasible for the owner and necessary for competition.112
Competition issues in Switzerland are governed by the Federal Act on Car-
tels and Other Competition Restraints of 6 October 1995 (the “Cartel Act”).113
The Cartel Act is the result of a strong political willingness to maintain and im-
prove the competitiveness of the Swiss economy.  Indeed, a day after the
Agreement on the European Economic Area was rejected by the Swiss people
and the cantons, the government decided to create a working group with a
mandate to propose a new legal framework in order to strengthen competition
in Switzerland.  Three years later, several laws were adopted to form the “revi-
talization program,” whose main purpose was increasing competition within the
country.  This new competition policy is an important part of the “package”
that includes the following laws: the Cartel Act, the Federal Law on the Elimi-
nation of Technical Obstacles to Trade, and the Federal Law on the Internal
Market.114
A. Application of Competition Rules
Two categories of instruments are at the disposal of the Swiss Competition
Commission in order to promote a competitive environment: (1) the competi-
tion enforcement measures and (2) the instruments of competition advocacy.
The Competition Commission may enforce competition within the three basic
pillars covering agreements,115 abuses of dominant positions (Article 7 of the
Cartel Act) ,116 and concentrations.117
According to the Cartel Act, horizontal agreements that fix prices, the quan-
tity or the range of products, or divide up markets geographically, are unlawful
under the principle that that such agreements eliminate effective competition.118
All other agreements—horizontal as well as vertical—are unlawful if they sig-
nificantly restrict competition and cannot be justified on grounds of economic
efficiency.  In addition, the Cartel Act indicates a non-exhaustive list of poten-
tial abuses of dominant positions that can be declared unlawful.  Finally, the
112. This is the doctrine of “essential facilities.”  See generally KATHARINA SCHINDLER,
WETTBEWERB IN NETZEN ALS PROBLEM DER KARTELLRECHLICHEN MISSBRAUCHAUFSICHT—DIE
“ESSENTIAL FACILITY”—DOKTRIN IM AMERIKANISCHEN, EUROPÄISCHEN UND SCHWEIZERISCHEN
KARTELLRECHT (1998).
113. See Federal Act on Cartels and Other Competition Restraints of Oct. 6, 1995, RS 251 (1996)
(Switz.).
114. See RS 251, RS 946.51, RS 943.02 (Switz.).
115. See RS 251, art. 5 (Switz.).
116. See id. art 7.
117. See id. arts. 9-10, 32-38; Swiss Federal Council’s Ordinance on the Control of Concentrations of
Undertakings, RS 251.4 (Switz.).
118. See RS 251, art. 7 (Switz.).
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Competition Commission may prohibit a concentration, or may authorize it
subject to certain conditions or obligations, if the investigation reveals that the
concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position liable to eliminate ef-
fective competition and does not correspondingly strengthen competition in
some other market.  In order to effectuate this control by the authority, the Car-
tel Act requires advance notice of planned mergers to the Competition Com-
mission if the turnover of the enterprises concerned exceeds certain limits,119 or
if the concentration relates to markets for which one of the participating under-
takings has been the subject of a decision establishing a dominant position.120
Second, the Competition Commission may promote competition by offering
advisory opinions to the Swiss federal and cantonal governments and lawmak-
ers in the consultation procedures.121  Furthermore, it monitors the competition
situation, and it may address recommendations to the authorities in order to
promote effective competition, especially regarding the drafting and enforce-
ment of laws.122
One of the shortcomings of the Cartel Act is the lack of power conferred on
the Competition Commission to impose penalties on parties who are found to
have restrained competition.  To remedy this situation, a revision of the Cartel
Act is underway.  The major innovation of the revised law would be the intro-
duction of direct penalties into the Cartel Act, as opposed to the current re-
gime, where the Competition Commission may sanction cartels only if they do
not respect a decision or the terms of an amicable settlement with the author-
ity.123
B. Exemption from the Field of Application?
In principle, Swiss competition law covers the entire economy; yet Article 3
of the Cartel Act provides several important exemptions.  For example, compe-
tition law does not apply if other legal provisions do not allow competition in a
market for certain goods or services.  Such provisions take precedence over the
provisions of the Cartel Act and include (1) provisions establishing an official
market or price system and (2) provisions entrusting certain enterprises with the
performance of public interest tasks, granting them special rights.  In many
cases, markets that are not yet liberalized or are in the process of liberalization
fall under the exemption of Article 3 of the Cartel Act.  In these situations, the
119. A notification is required if in the last accounting period prior to the concentration, the under-
takings concerned reported joint turnover of at least 2 billion Swiss francs worldwide or turnover in
Switzerland of at least 500 million Swiss francs.  At least two of the undertakings concerned reported
individual turnover in Switzerland of at least 100 million Swiss francs.
120. See RS 251, art. 9(4) (Switz.).  This provision was applied to Swisscom after the Blue Window
case, in which the Competition Commission considered that this company was holding a dominant posi-
tion in the telecommunications market.  See 2 COMMISSION DE LA CONCURRENCE, DROIT ET
POLITIQUE DE LA CONCURRENCE 161 (1997) (visited Dec. 4, 2000)  <http://www.wettbewerbskom
mission.ch/site/g/praxis/rpw/recht_und_politik_des_wettbewerbs_1997_html>.
121. See RS 251, art. 46 (Switz.).
122. See id. art. 45
123. See id. art. 54
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Competition Commission can be active only through instruments of “competi-
tion advocacy.”  It should be emphasized, however, that the general view is that
the above exemption applies only in a very restrictive way.124  This opinion is
shared by the Competition Commission, which opened several investigations
into the electricity market.125
Critics of liberalization argue that reforms affect distributional goals, such as
universal service.  This issue arises in the infrastructure of natural monopoly
settings, where mandatory service obligations are funded by cross-subsidies.
One of the most common justifications for protecting the incumbent firm from
the entry of outside competitors is related to the existence of cross-subsidies in
the tariff structure in order to attain some social goal, so that some services are
provided at a loss, while others show high profit in order to compensate these
losses.126  Thus, in the past it was argued that the introduction of competition for
the provision of telecommunication services, such as telephone services, would
harm universal services.  This argument was based on the tendency for incum-
bent monopoly operators to grossly exaggerate the cost of universal service
provision.127
For governments, the first task of reform is often to identify and define the
scope of the desired universality of the service.  For example, in the European
Union, the desired universality consists of the benefits that are essential for so-
cial ties or respecting fundamental liberties, which must be furnished to all at an
affordable price and according to minimum standards of quality.128  In this area,
the purpose of universal service legislation is twofold.  First, it ensures its con-
tinued provision throughout the collectivity.  Second, it avoids methods for its
financing that would create barriers to entry for new competitors, thereby un-
duly subsidizing incumbent operators.  The net cost of providing universal
services must be shared between operators through a universal service fund.
Governments that have liberalized telecommunication markets have continued
to maintain universal service as a priority policy; however, countries have de-
fined, delivered, and funded universal services in several ways with the onset of
competition.  In some countries, such as the United States, targeted subsidies
funded by a special levy on customers have been provided to compensate for
the high costs of providing service in specific areas or to specific income
groups.129  In other countries, such as Australia and the United Kingdom, the
burden of universal services is shared among operators.
124. See ROGER ZÄCH, SCHWEIZERISCHES KARTELLRECHT 125 (1999).
125. See id.
126. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
41 (1996).
127. See 1 ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOP. AND DEV., REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM:
SECTORAL STUDIES 40 (1997) [hereinafter OECD, SECTORAL STUDIES].
128. See 2 ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., REPORT ON REGULATORY
REFORM: THEMATIC STUDIES 259 (1997).
129. See OECD, SECTORAL STUDIES, supra note 127.
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In Switzerland, the content of universal telecommunication services is le-
gally defined in Article 16 of the 1997 federal law on telecommunications, the
LTC:
The holder of a license to provide universal service shall provide the following techni-
cally state of the art services to meet demand in the area covered by the license:
a. public telephone service, i.e. transmission of speech in real time by means of tele-
communication techniques, including transmission of data employing transfer
rates compatible with the channels transmitting speech;
b. access to emergency call services;
c. sufficient public call boxes;
d. access to the Swiss directories of subscribers to the public telephone service;
e. a transcription service for people with impaired hearing, allowing them full access
to telephone and emergency call services at comparable terms and conditions.130
In Switzerland, the former monopolist Swisscom has been granted an exclu-
sive five-year license that will expire at the end of 2002.131  The special indemni-
fication regime provided under the LTC does not apply during this period.132  In
view of the above considerations, within the strict limits of Article 3 of the Car-
tel Act, it appears that universal services are, as a general rule, exempted from
competition policy.  The precise boundaries of this exemption are, however,
rather difficult to define.  It will be effective in the reserved areas where the
legislature intended to grant exclusive or special rights.  On the other hand,
some provisions of the LTC impose special competition policy obligations on
universal service suppliers.  In particular, a universal service supplier must grant
interconnection services to other providers even when it does not hold a domi-
nant position.133  The Swiss lawmakers have set up an entire regime that gives
the regulator the power to intervene should the universal service supplier take
advantage of its position.134
C. Mixed Rules and Situations
The protection of effective competition is vital to the entire legal regime
governing the liberalization of the Swiss telecommunications sector.  It is part of
the purpose clause of the law135 and appears explicitly in other legal provisions.136
130. LTC, supra note 67, art. 16.
131. See id. art. 66(1).
132. See id; see also id. art. 19(1):
If it is clear from the invitation to tender that, even with cost-effective management,
it will be impossible for the investment required for the universal service in any
given area to be written off within the usual period, the applicant who submits the
best bid shall receive a contribution to the investment when the license is required.
Id.
133. See id. art. 11(2).
134. See, e.g., OTS, supra note 68, art. 21 (imposing quality criteria); OTS, art. 23 (mandating maxi-
mum rates).
135. See LTC, supra note 67, art. 1(2)(c).
136. The LTC provides:
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It bears repeating that interconnection regulations use the concept of dominant
position to define the appropriate market share for the suppliers of these serv-
ices.  While the final determination rests in the hands of ComCom, the factual
and legal analysis is performed in cooperation with the Competition Commis-
sion, which gives an opinion on the subject upon the regulator’s request.137
Issues pertaining to competition were also present in the legislative proc-
ess—for example, when the Swiss Parliament had to decide on the regime ap-
plicable to new procedures, such as those governing rights-of-way.  In making
this decision, the Parliament had to choose between public and private property
and between a monopoly or a liberalized market.  Other considerations in-
cluded how many new lines to install and whether to have underground or
overhead lines.
In its draft law presented to the Swiss Parliament, the Federal Council opted
for absolute rights-of-way in favor of all telecommunication license holders, free
of any indemnification and authorization procedures and applicable to all pub-
lic and private properties.  This was considered excessive by the Parliament,
which eventually adopted a “softer” regime.138
Before its liberalization, the Swiss telecommunication market was subject to
the monopoly of the state-owned Swiss Telecom PTT.  The Federal Law on
Electrical Installations granted that company an absolute right to use public
property without need for authorization.139  When several new players arrive on
the market, it is necessary to give a minimum amount of control to the owner(s)
of such property.  Moreover, owners of public property—such as the munici-
palities or, in Switzerland, the cantons that own pavements and roads—will not
want operators to dig up their streets multiple times for the same purpose.
Therefore, they will require these operators to coordinate their actions, and
Swiss regulations provide for this coordination duty among operators.140
The “lines installed/lines to be installed” consideration is closely related to
the “monopoly/liberalized market” consideration.  Once the market is liberal-
ized, former monopoly companies have an obvious competitive advantage over
new players:  They already own a very significant network, usually covering
most of the country, while newcomers must build a network from scratch.  Al-
though interconnection is part of the solution, it cannot be the whole solution.
Assuming that, as in Switzerland, the monopolist had been able to build its net-
The granting of a radiocommunications license must not eliminate or constitute a
serious obstacle to effective competition unless an exception can be justified on
grounds of economic efficiency.  In case of doubt, the licensing authority shall con-
sult the Competition Commission.
Id. art. 23(4).
137. See id. art. 11(3).
138. See id. art. 35.
139. See Federal Law on Electrical Installations, art. 6, 4 RECUEIL SYSTÉMATIQUE DES LOIS ET
ORDONNANCES 798 (1848-1947) (repealed).
140. See OTS, supra note 68, art. 25 (relating to public policy concerns, such as protection of the en-
vironment, that are also present in other situations, like collocation where providers have to share part
of their installations with other market participants).
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work free of charge without authorization, competition would be adversely af-
fected because it would create additional costs (barriers) to market entrants if
the lawmaker were to require authorization and the payment of an indemnity
before the installation of new lines.
Competition would also be adversely affected if the regime favored a special
category of new players, such as those using facilities in other markets, for ex-
ample electricity companies and railways.  Again, requirements relating to a
strict authorization procedure and indemnification would disadvantage tele-
communications companies that could not use electricity lines, ducts, or installa-
tions along railways to build their network.
The additional nuisance caused by overhead lines should also be taken into
consideration and should result in a regime different from that applicable to
underground lines.  For example, one could envision a full authorization proce-
dure with an indemnity to be paid to the owners of the properties crossed by
overhead lines.
V
CONCLUSION
In the process of liberalizing a market, competition law and sectoral regula-
tions are closely related and often interact.  Of course, one could argue that
“the market”in other words, effective competitionshould be the sole de-
terminant of providers’ attitudes toward customers, in particular the services to
be supplied and to whom and in what quantity.  Then, a situation would de-
velop where only competition authorities intervene, because the sectoral regu-
lator would have disappeared from the scene.  However, this situation ignores
the fact that liberalized services, such as telecommunications and electricity, are
part of public services, are essential elements of today’s economies, and involve
public interest aspects that cannot be addressed exclusively by competition.
This is the case, for example, with universal services, which is the reason that
Swiss current telecommunications regulations and the future Electricity Act
contain specific provisions to guarantee basic services to the whole Swiss popu-
lation, including people living in areas that it would not make commercial sense
to reach and cover.
Switzerland also set up a regime where the regulatorComComclosely
cooperates with the competition authority.  Several provisions of the LTC pro-
vide that ComCom will seek advice from the competition authority.  The idea
behind this provision is to obtain an opinion from the Competition Commis-
sion, as a specialized authority, on concrete questions related to its field of
competence.  Typically, the Competition Commission will assist ComCom in an
interconnection procedure by determining whether a telecommunications serv-
ices provider holds a dominant position.  In addition, the Competition Commis-
sion should keep its own competence of intervening in matters relating directly
to the field of application of the Cartel Act, such as competition restraints and
merger control.
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Situations exist where the application of regulatory measures has to be care-
fully watched from a competition standpoint.  For example, although sharing
should be encouraged as a means of providing efficient services to customers,
notably in terms of coverage, there are risks involved.  One such risk is of fa-
voring anti-competitive conduct (agreements or creation of collective dominant
positions).  Collocation might also reduce the rate at which efficient individual
networks develop, with new providers relying too heavily on the former mo-
nopolists’ networks.  Finally, the coordination duty imposed in connection with
the use of public land by telecommunications providers might lead to some
“parasitism” and violation of commercial and industrial secrecy, where competi-
tors are made aware of the development plans of the other operators.
